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The comparative study of Chinese and European legal history is arguably as old as
the social sciences themselves. Comparisons between the "Chinese legal tradition"
and European ones lie, after all, at the heart of Max Weber's seminal studies on econ-
omy and society-hardly surprising, given Weber's extensive legal background.' In
recent decades, comparative Chinese and European legal history, broadly defined,
has thrived in both Chinese academic circles and foreign ones, across a number of
disciplines, including history, law, economics, and sociology. This article reviews the
basic trends in this literature and suggests avenues for future research, both thematic
and methodological. Given its length limitations, it makes no claim to be a compre-
hensive survey of the "field," if we can call it that. Rather, it seeks to highlight some
of the major intellectual themes that, in the author's perhaps idiosyncratic experi-
ence, scholars in the field have regularly grappled with, with varying levels of success.
The goal, ultimately, is to discuss how progress might be made.
Existing studies seem to fall, for the most part, into three general categories: the
first, most densely populated category includes works that use comparative methods
as an illustrative tool. Historical Chinese institutions are compared with functionally
similar European ones, so that we can better understand their structure, operation,
and, in some cases, origins-rarely are these works focused on better understanding
European institutions. The second category, increasingly prominent in recent years,
studies historical interactions between China and the West, including the translation
of legal texts and treatises, imperial and colonial experiences, and disputes in the
international legal arena. The third category includes what one might call "divergence
studies," which seek to explain how and, more importantly, why Chinese and
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European institutions differed, generally in the context of early modern global eco-
nomic divergence.
The first category, which has been particularly popular in Mainland China, has
expanded Sino-European comparisons into an ever-wider array of legal issues, mov-
ing well beyond the traditional focus on penal law.2 It has also made Chinese legal
history more easily accessible to a wide range of social sciences, which would other-
wise have some difficulty digesting the material. At the same time, however, such
"translation"- despite the intellectual enrichment it provides-comes at significant
analytical cost: by focusing on the Chinese end of the comparison, and using
European narratives primarily as reference points, it arguably perpetuates preexisting
imbalances in our understanding of global legal history, in which studies of
"Western" history continue to analytically color the study of other legal traditions,
rendering us unable to engage them on their own terms, or even through their own
legal language. This "methodological Eurocentricism" continues to be surprisingly re-
silient in comparative history, despite decades of academic criticism. Chinese scholars
themselves have been at least as guilty of this as those who work from abroad, creat-
ing a curious "reverse orientalism" that permeates large sectors of Chinese legal
academia.
The second category is, in many ways, a reaction against this longstanding imbal-
ance: it seeks to place China and "the West" on more equal analytical footing by ex-
amining the ways in which Western legal systems evolved in reaction against the
Chinese "other." This echoes a growing tendency among scholars of both colonial
history and international law to emphasize the legal impact of the colonial "periph-
ery" on the European "center." Successful as it most certainly has been, this vein of
scholarship has its own share of problems: precisely because it focuses on actual legal
encounters between China and the West, it seems to dance around, rather than con-
front head-on, the difficulties implicit in the kind of functionalist comparison at-
tempted in the first category. The Sino-European comparisons that these "legal
encounters" studies focus on are, for the most part, those conducted by early modern
historical actors within the specific context of their colonial experiences, rather than
those conducted by the authors themselves from a (potentially) more objective,
functionalist perspective. The two categories ask, therefore, fundamentally different
questions: crudely summarized, the first category seeks primarily to explain why
Chinese and European institutions differed, whereas the second category focuses
more on explaining how those (perceived) differences actually mattered.
The third category-"divergence studies"-seeks to tackle both questions. It
returns to the functionalist method, but does so within a more concrete historical
context that explains why the differences between the Chinese and European legal
traditions were historically significant. It examines, depending on one's preferred
terminology, either "the rise of the West" or "the relative decline of China" from an
institutional dimension: what were the institutional differences that are commonly
2 For an example of the traditional penal law oriented literature, see DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW
IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1967). The current "countermovement" against the penal law-focus began, for the
most part, with CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA (Kathryn Bernhardt & Philip C.C. Huang eds.,
1994).
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thought to have contributed to the material divergence between China and Europe
in the modern era? Did they in fact contribute, and in what sense? What explains
these institutional differences? The primary difference between this category and the
first category is that "divergence studies" make a somewhat dearer argument for why
comparisons between Chinese and European legal history are academically signifi-
cant: legal comparisons can help us understand the economic and geopolitical power
shifts that, for better or worse, defined much of modern world history.
Given the questions that it seeks to answer, "divergence studies" necessarily ex-
tends far beyond the confines of the history profession. In its current state, it already
draws from virtually all the social sciences, and has taken advantage of this methodo-
logical diversity to make enormous advances in our understandings of Chinese and
European legal and economic history. There are, however, shortcomings in the pre-
existing literature: most importantly, it is largely separated into those studies that ex-
amine the socioeconomic consequences of legal institutions and those that examine
their origins. Rarely are the two merged into a unified thesis, even when such unifica-
tion would add significant depth and power. In many ways, this disconnect lays bare
the methodological tensions created by the intersection of multiple academic disci-
plines within "divergence studies."
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: sections A, B, and C discuss,
respectively, categories one, two and three. A short conclusion explores-very tenta-
tively-whether an expansion of category three to cover a greater variety of geo-
graphical regions can plausibly generate a "category four" that analyzes early modern
and modern legal development in a somewhat more general and theoretical manner,
and therefore can speak more directly to normatively-minded scholars.
A. "Illustrative comparisons"
I have labelled studies belonging to category one "illustrative comparisons" because
their basic objective is, at least self-avowedly, simply to highlight particular features
of Chinese or European legal history through a comparative exercise. It is probably
fair to say that this is the most straightforward of the three categories. For the most
part, works in this category ask how historical Chinese and (some) European law
handled a particular legal issue-in other words, they select functionally similar legal
institutions from both sides-and identify the primary differences and similarities. In
many cases, the analysis ends at this stage.3 In others, the author(s) will attempt to
explain the differences, some speculatively, others in fairly exhaustive detail.4
3 For example, the sections of ZHANG JINFAN. ZHONGGUO FALU DE CHUANTONG YU JINDAI ZHUAN'XNG [TIE
TRADITIONS AND EARLY MODERN TRANSFORMATION OF CHINESE LAw] (1997) that apply a comparative method
do so in a purely descriptive fashion. Another fairly well-known example is Fan Zhongxin, Zhongxi Falu
Chuantong zhong de "Qin Qin xiang Yin' [The Practice of Kinsmen Concealing Each Other's Misconduct in the
Chinese and Western Legal Traditions], 1997(3) ZHONGGUO SIHHuI KEXUE [CHINESE SOCIAL SCIENCES] 87.
4 Some have attempted to expand ZhangJinfan's descriptive comparison into a causal thesis: see, e.g., Zhang
Benshun, Ziran Dili Huanjin Shiye xia de Zhong Xi Falu Chuantong [Chinese and Western Legal Traditions
from an Ecological Perspective], 2013(6) XIBU FAXUE PINCLUN [WESTERN CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE REVIEW] 78;
Fan Zhongxin, Ziran Renwen Dili yu Zhonghua Falu Chuantong zhi Tezheng [Cultural Geography and the
Characteristics of the Chinese Legal Tradition], 25(3) XIANDAI FAXuE [MODERN LEGAL SCIENCE] 40 (2003).
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The value of such methods lies, first and foremost, in the general truism that com-
parison draws our attention to things we otherwise would not have noticed. For ex-
ample, a common theme in this literature is that English, and perhaps Western
European, legal history evolved upon the basis of both the separation of church and
state and the division of the state into feudal jurisdictions, both of which not only
limited the authority of the nominal sovereign, but also encouraged institutional
competition between these often overlapping jurisdictionss In comparison, Chinese
law is often thought of as being centralized under the absolute authority of the
emperor. A common argument based on this comparison is that the centralization of
legal authority in China discouraged the "rule of law," while the segregated nature of
European law encouraged political compliance with legal rules.6 Whereas the intui-
tions behind these arguments may seem completely obvious to many scholars, they
would be much less so without the comparison: as a purely theoretical matter, at
least, there are other possibilities. For example, centralized political entities could
nonetheless be motivated to establish the "rule of law" to bind their successors, and
indeed their greater coercive capacities might have allowed them to do so more effec-
tively than a segregated legal system.
In addition, such comparisons also enhance the accessibility of Chinese legal
history to scholars in the other social sciences, most of whom-even those who
received their education in Mainland China-have been trained in a Western style
system. To them, understanding historical Chinese institutions via their similarities
and differences with Western ones is likely easier than simply engaging with Chinese
history through its own concepts and language: for example, the concept of "mort-
gage" or "collateralized debt" most familiar to Chinese economists is, in all likeli-
hood, the "modern" concept employed in contemporary Chinese law, which was
transplanted from German and Japanese sources in the early 2 0 th century.
7 Historical
Chinese collateral transactions are perhaps most easily understood, therefore, as
"mortgages" with adjusted features, rather than as "conditional sales"-which is how
a landowner in 19 th century North China, for example, likely would have understood
them.
There is a fairly straightforward historical explanation for this state of affairs: by
and large, the Chinese social sciences, including history and law, had to be rebuilt af-
ter the Cultural Revolution.8 By this time, the society that these newly trained social
scientists lived in had already adopted large amounts of nominally "Western"-
including Soviet-institutions, and the predominant analytical methods taught in
universities were adapted (or simply copied wholescale) from Western sources.9 The
5 For example, Xu Aiguo, Xifang Guojia Fazhi de Xingcheng dui Zhongguo de Canzhao [The Development of the
Rule of Law in Western Countries and its Reference Value for China], 403 RENMIN LUNTAN [PEOPLE'S FORUM]
5 (2013), available at http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2013-05/11/content-1250273.htm?div -1.
6 Id.
7 For example, LIANG ZHIPING, QINGDMA XIGUAN FA: SHEHUI Yu GUOJIA [OJNG CUSTOMARY LAW: SOCIETY AND
STATE] 93 (1996); Wu, XIANGHONG. DIAN ZHI FENGSU Yu DLAN ZHI FALU [THE CUSTOMS AND LAWS
REGULATING "DA" SALES] (2009).
8 See Yu SANDING, XUESHU DE ZIJUE YU XUEZHE DE ZILI: DANGDAI XUEZHE YANJIU [THE SELF-AWARENESS OF
SCHOLARSHIP AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF SCHOLARS: A STUDY ON CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARS] (1998).
9 See, eg XU YouYU, ZHONGGUO DANGDM ZHENGZHI WENHUA YU XIFNG ZHENGZHI ZHEXUE [CONTEMPORARY
CHINESE POLITICAL CULTURE AND WESTERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY] (2008).
Beyond Methodological Eurocentricism - 199
severe social and political turmoil of the 2 0th century, coupled with extremely rapid
industrial growth after the mid-century, created an enormous experiential gap be-
tween end-of-century academics and the historical world that existed before 1911, or
even 1949. In many ways, comparative studies help them bridge the gap as much as
they would help, for example, an American legal scholar attempting to understand
Qing property institutions, or Republican corporate charters.
This comes, however, at a significant risk: there is always the danger that some-
thing is "lost in translation"-some subtle but perhaps significant aspect of Chinese
law actually becomes harder to understand once we explain them via comparison to
European ones. Do comparative methods encourage us to overemphasize the differ-
ences, or overlook deeper distinctions that course beneath facial similarities? The
common condemnation of much comparative history as "Eurocentric" is, most obvi-
ously, a condemnation of the normative assumption that "other parts of the world
must become like Europe to 'develop' or 'modernize,'"' but it can also be a condem-
nation of empirical biases, of the need to understand or explain non-European con-
cepts as mutations of European ones. The latter may, in fact, be much more difficult
to overcome than the former.
Paradoxically, one consequence of the latter-a more "methodological" kind of
Eurocentricism, rather than normative or thematic-is that the great majority of
these "illustrative comparisons" focus primarily on China.11 The bulk of their pri-
mary research lies in Chinese archives, whereas the European comparison is derived
from preexisting secondary material, very little of it comparative in nature. At the in-
dividual level, this is often perfectly reasonable, as many scholars may simply be
more fluent in the Chinese side of the comparison, or care more about it. When,
however, it becomes a common trait across virtually an entire subfield of comparative
studies, it suggests the existence of certain systemic biases: even today, many, argu-
ably most, scholars seem to accept that we can learn more about Chinese legal his-
tory by comparing it with Europe, but rarely does the assumption extend in the
opposite direction-that we can learn more about Europe by comparing it with
China. The critical analysis that the comparison enables only applies to the Chinese
"subject," and not to the relatively unquestioned European "paradigm." The danger
here is two-fold: first, European legal history does not benefit enough from the
cross-examination and analytical enrichment that rigorous comparison potentially
provides-in fact, we are arguably not learning anything about European law via the
comparative exercise that we could not learn just as easily should we discard the
Chinese comparison altogether. Second, by pegging Chinese legal history into what
are essentially European analytical holes, we risk seriously misunderstanding it.
That these tendencies are also prevalent-arguably more so-among Mainland
Chinese scholars is hardly surprising. As noted above, the social sciences, history in-
cluded, were more or less "rebooted" after 1976 on the mainland, under
10 Immanuel Wallerstein, Eurocentricism and Its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science, 46 SOCIOLOGICAL
BULLETIN 21 (1997); Arif Dirlik, Is There History After Eurocentrism?: Globalism, Postcolonialism, and the
Disavowal of History, 42 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 1 (1994).
11 This is broadly true of all material cites in supra notes 3-5. Xu, supra note 5, devotes more space to
Western legal history, but relies completely on secondary material when doing so, and comes back in the
end to "how Western legal traditions can inform our understanding of China."
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predominantly "Western" intellectual influence. This occurred at roughly the same
time that the Chinese intellectual world began to reject Communist ideology in favor
of "Western liberalism," however defined. Combined, these trends dramatically
boosted the stature and prestige of Western, particularly American, scholarship in
China, and led several generations of scholars, beginning in the 1980s, to "self-orien-
talize," for lack of a better term. More recently, this has triggered a fierce backlash
from those who advocate the development of a uniquely Chinese paradigm of legal
development, free from what they see as Western intellectual dominance. 
12
Within the confines of comparative legal history, these tendencies are perhaps
most clearly observed in the most public law-oriented-and therefore most visible-
fields. The aforementioned essay on the separation of powers, for example, draws the
conclusion that, in some basic sense, China simply did not have a real "legal tradi-
tion" to speak of-and, judging by the exacting standards through which the paper
defines "the rule of law," likely still does not have one.13 This basic message, that the
Chinese legal tradition lacks some desirable feature that the "Western legal tradition"
possesses, is, in the author's experience, a fairly common one among "illustrative
comparative histories."
Even the studies that expressly reject this message often cannot help but analyze
Chinese institutions via distinctively "Western" analytical frameworks, many drawn di-
rectly from the author's exposure to European and American legal history. For exam-
ple, a recent study on Chinese constitutional history argues against the common
presumption that, because Chinese law did not expressly limit the highest political ac-
tor's authority, it therefore had no tradition of constitutionalism. The author argues
that this understanding of "constitutionalism" is too narrow, and that a more expan-
sive, "functionalist" definition will pave the path towards a fairer analysis of Chinese
constitutional history.14 If we understand "constitution" in what the author considers
to be the "original meaning" of the word-the act of "constituting" the state through
legal and political documents and defining its fundamental functions-then not only
does China have a rich "constitutional" history, but also an arguably successful one.
But how does the author derive this "original meaning"? Ironically, by looking at
Western European constitutional history, and redefining the term within his interpreta-
tion of this European, and particularly English, historical context. In the end, the book
leaps from one "Eurocentric" constitutional paradigm to another.
There are, of course, exceptions to the general trend. A recent study by Zhiqiang
Wang, for example, compares the use of precedent in early modern Chinese, English,
and French adjudication, reexamining the political and intellectual foundations that
underlay each system through detailed comparison with the other two. 5 Core con-
cepts, including the very notion of "precedent," are considered and remodeled over
the course of the comparative exercise, leading to a tighter definition that facilitates
12 For an early and influential example, see DENG ZHENGLAI, ZHONGGUO FAXUE XIANG HECHU QU [WHERE
SHOULD CHINESE LEGAL STUDIES Go?] (2006).
13 Xu, supra note 5. See also, He Weifang et al., Fazhi ji Qj Xifang Ziyuan [The Rule of Law and Its Western
Resources], 2011(1) ZHONGSHAN DAXUE FALU PINGLUN [SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW] 45.
14 ZHU SULI, THE CONSTITUTION OF ANCIENT CHINA (forthcoming, Princeton University Press).
15 ZHIQANG WANG, CASE PRECEDENT IN CHINESE AND WESTERN LEGAL TRADITIONS (book manuscript in prog-
ress, on ffle with author).
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more refined functional comparisons. Clearly, this is one productive way forward
from the current state of affairs.
Analytical imbalance is, in any case, only one of several basic problems with "illus-
trative comparisons." An arguably more fundamental one is how to justify the choice
to compare China with Europe: given all the comparative pairings available, why
choose this particular one? Why focus so much on East-West comparisons, rather
than East-East, or perhaps East-South, comparisons? Is this merely another manifes-
tation of our subconscious "methodological Eurocentricism"-that the history of
"developing countries" must be compared to that of the developed world to gain rel-
evance and salience, or perhaps that non-European societies must continue to obsess
over how they legally "failed" (but in what sense, other than not having the same fea-
tures as Western systems)? Much recent scholarship on Sino-European comparisons
expressly struggle with these questions, and respond in a variety of ways. Two of the
most common strategies are examined in sections B and C.
B. Sino-European "legal encounters"
A number of scholars have responded by studying the actual historical encounter be-
tween Chinese and European legal ideas and institutions in the early modern era, as
well as the consequences of these encounters. In other words, Sino-European compari-
sons mattered because they influenced the actual trajectory of legal change in both
China and Europe. Many-although certainly not all-of these studies explicitly at-
tempt to push back against the "Eurocentric" or "orientalist" tendencies discussed above
by emphasizing the "feedback effect," so to speak, that Chinese law had on European le-
gal discourse. In doing so, they echo a growing tendency among scholars of both impe-
rialism and international law to acknowledge the intellectual and legal impact that the
colonial "periphery" had on the European imperial "center." Whereas earlier genera-
tions of scholars focused primarily on the influence that, for example, British imperial-
ism had on sociopolitical identity and institutions on its various Asian and African
colonies, much recent work argues that influence also flows in the opposite direction.
16
Two of the most compelling examples are Li Chen's Chinese Law in Imperial Eyes,
and Teemu Ruskola's Legal Orientalism. Chen's manuscript examines "the formation
and transformation of Western knowledge" in response to its perception of Chinese
law and society in the century leading up to the Opium War.17 It begins by narrating
a number of early encounters between European merchants and the pre-1840 Qing
state-which was, as Chen observes, suspicious of foreigners and institutionally
unaccommodating-and then explains how these encounters informed and, to some
extent, shaped European debates about the ideals of modern law and government in
the 1 8th and early 19th centuries, laying much of the legal foundation for the later
19 th century imperial experience.
16 For example, LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES,
1400-1900 (2009); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE ]MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005); LAUREN BENTON, LAw AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY (2001);
Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities, 27 THIRD WORLD
Q 739 (2006); James T. Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism, and International Law, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 1013
(2007).
17 Li CHEN, CHINESE LAw IN IMPERIAL EYES: SOVEREIGNTY, JUSTICE, AND TRANSCULTURAL POLITICS (2015).
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Chronologically, Legal Orientalism picks up largely where Chinese Law in Imperial
Eyes leaves off in the later 19th century, when Western imperial powers had already
established their military, economic, and diplomatic dominance over a weakened
Qing state.18 With this material dominance came new forms of legal imperialism, in-
cluding the establishment of extraterritorial jurisdictions in major Chinese ports.
Ruskola's core argument is that, partially fueled by these experiences, the notion of a
"lawless" and stagnant Chinese "other" soon became a critical component of
Western, and particularly American, legal and political identity, in that it reinforced
(and still reinforces) the notion that law and "the rule of law" are somehow unique,
and therefore central, to Western political systems. To sustain this perception, con-
sciously or not, generations of Western lawyers and scholars insisted on misinterpret-
ing basic facts and experiences about Chinese law, ranging from court systems and
evidentiary procedures to corporate institutions, in a way that was consistent with
the notion of Chinese "lawlessness."
These studies, and others like them,19 add a much-needed dimension to our under-
standing of Sino-European legal interactions. Turning "Eurocentricism" on its head,
they allow the European side of the comparison to become more than a staid analytical
reference point, more than an unresponsive "source" or "center" that exists merely to
highlight the evolution of Chinese law. It is somewhat ironic that Ruskola's research
on Western legal development in light of its imperial experience reveals a persistent
campaign by American and European lawyers to portray the Chinese "other" as itself
staid and unresponsive to the forces of modernity. Even so, uncovering this act of
distortion breathes life and intellectual dynamism-perhaps of dubious quality, but
dynamism nonetheless-into the history of Western legal imperialism.
Despite its many achievements, there are limitations to the "legal encounters"
methodology: first, given its subject matter, it necessarily focuses on institutions that
played an actual role in the historical interaction between China and Europe. This
privileges certain parts of the legal apparatus-those related to international commerce
and diplomacy, for example-over others-those related to domestic civil matters, for
example-and may leave entire portions of the apparatus out in the cold.
In addition, the kind of comparison that these studies engage in is, for the most
part, second-hand. Again because of their subject matter, they necessarily focus more
on how historical actors understood the Sino-European comparison than how the
authors themselves understood that comparison. While there is much to be said
about this approach, it also precludes the kind of functionalist (and hopefully more
objective) comparison that many, perhaps most, comparativists still consider to be
the fundamental mission of comparative law-and that "category one" comparisons
largely belong to.2 0 The specific manner in which the "legal encounters" approach
dances around the methodological problems discussed above can be somewhat
18 TEEMU RUSKOL LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MODERN LAW (2013).
19 In some ways, the predecessors to these studies is JONATHAN SPENCE, THE KHAN'S GREAT CONTINENT,
CHINA IN WESTERN MINDS (1998), and the literature on Western conceptions of China that it came to
(somewhat) represent.
20 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed.,
1998); Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAw 339 (2006).
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unsatisfying in this regard. It cannot really solve those problems because it has, in a
very fundamental way, changed the nature of the inquiry: instead of asking "how and
why did Chinese and European laws differ," as category one tends to do, it asks
"how did those differences matter." The answer it provides-that contemporary
perceptions of difference impacted legal development on both sides-actually renders
the former question somewhat meaningless: what mattered were perceived differ-
ences, instead of real ones.
C. "Divergence studies"
Is there a way to do comparative Sino-European legal history that addresses both
questions in a more synthetic manner? One solution that has begun to gain traction
in recent years, due to the ascension of New Institutional Economics, is to do the
comparison within a broader context of global economic divergence-that is, to ask
how Sino-European institutional differences affected their respective economic per-
formance, and then to explain how those institutional differences emerged in the first
place.2 1 This gives an immediate and powerful answer to the question of "why does
the comparison matter": it matters because it helps us understand one of the most
consequential power shifts-from China to Western Europe-in human history.
The challenge is then to demonstrate that legal differences actually helped generate
the "Great Divergence,"22 or at least some portion of it. Much more so than the pre-
vious two categories, "divergence studies" are innately linked to a dear and fairly def-
inite objective: to illustrate and then explain the 19 th century economic divergence
between China and Western Europe. Its progress is, therefore, measured by how suc-
cessfully it does this, rather than by other, more artificial standards. The field is there-
fore "functionalist all the way down," in its choice of which institutions to compare,
the ways in which it compares them, and, ultimately, which comparisons are deemed
more successful than others.
The centerpiece of the divergence was, of course, the basic fact that Western
Europe began large-scale industrialization nearly two centuries before China. At pre-
sent, scholars have yet to produce anything close to a generally accepted "theory of
industrialization," which means that it is very much an open question whether-and
which-legal institutions had anything to do with the divergence. One benefit of this
state of affairs is that it preempts the kind of analytical imbalance that tends to char-
acterize "category one" studies: the danger of forcing Chinese facts within European
theoretical paradigms is lessened because there really is no "European paradigm" to
speak of. Many of the most influential works in the field focus, in fact, more on the
European side, seeking to understand the socioeconomic performance of English,
21 For example, CHRISTOPHER ISETT, STATE, PEASANT AND MERCHANT IN QING MANCHURIA: 1644-1862 (2007);
DAVID FAURE, CHINA AND CAPITALISM: A HISTORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN MODERN CHINA (2006); Debin
Ma, Economic Growth in the Lower Yangzi Region of China in 1911 1937: A Quantitative and Historical
Analysis, 68 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 355-392 (2008); Robert Brenner & Christopher Isett,
England's Divergence from China's Yangtze Delta: Property Relations, Microeconomics, and Patterns of
Development, 61 J. oF ASIAN STUD. 609 (2002); Kenneth Pomeranz, Land Markets in Late Imperial and
Republican China, 23 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 101 (2008).
22 The most famous use of the phrase is, of course, KENNETH POMERANz, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: CHINA,
EUROPE, AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY (2000).
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Dutch, or French law via comparison to functionally similar Chinese institutions.
2 3
Those that focus more on the Chinese side, nonetheless, attempt to approach
European history with a critical and reexamining eye.24
This is not to say that there have been no attempts to create a "European
paradigm"-only that they have been, for the most part, unsuccessful. Douglass
North's argument that secure property rights drove "the rise of the Western world"
is probably as dose to a "paradigmatic argument" that the field has generated since
the mid-2 0 th century; however, even that has generated much more skepticism than
accord over the past two decades. More recent scholarship has fairly persuasively
demonstrated that many Asian societies, particularly China, actually provided strong
institutional protection for private property rights-even if the state was not neces-
sarily the entity that provided such protection.26 The economically significant differ-
ences between Chinese and Western European law, if they indeed existed, lay
elsewhere.
The sheer magnitude of the causal problem faced by "divergence studies" may
have helped prevent premature coalescing around potentially misleading paradigms.
One could argue that descriptive paradigms-such as "China lacked the rule of
law"-are perhaps easier to perpetuate than causal ones-such as "China's lack of
the rule of law hampered its economic development"-if only because the latter in-
volve more moving parts, and are therefore more difficult to support, even superfi-
cially. When the causal problem is as large and difficult as explaining global
economic divergence, it is wholly unsurprising that no dominant explanation has
emerged over the past several decades. For the purposes of critical and balanced
comparison, at least, this is probably a good thing.
Given all this, how should the field move forward? Despite the short-term benefits
of not having a dominant paradigm, it is probably in the field's longer-term interests
to produce one, or at least generate more empirical consensus among scholars. At
present, enough basic issues are still up in the air-including living standards in early
modern China,27 the scale and significance of proto-industrialization in both China
and large parts of Western Europe,28 and the detailed content of property and
23 For example, ROBERT ALLEN, THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2009); DARON
ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY AND POVERTY
(2010); Patrick O'Brien, State Formation and the Construction of Institutions for the First Industrial Nation,
in INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Ha Joon Chang ed., 2007).
24 The argument for doing so is made most explicitly in R. BIN WONG AND JEAN-LAURENT ROSENTHAL, BEFORE
AND BEYOND DIVERGENCE: THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE IN CHINA AND EUROPE (2011).
25 DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC
HISTORY (1976); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(1990); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, Economic History and Political Science,
12(3) THE POLITICAL ECONOMIST 4 (2005).
26 See, e.g., Peter C. Perdue, Property Rights on Imperial China's Frontiers, in LAND, PROPERTY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (John Rchards, ed., 2001); Madeleine Zelin, A Critique of Rights of Property in Prewar
China, in CONTRACT AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN CHINA 17 (Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko &
Robert Gardella eds., 2004).
27 See, e.g., the debate between POMERANz, supra note 22; and Philip C.C. Huang, Development or Involution
in Eighteenth-Century Britain and China?, 61 J. ASIAN STUD. 501 (2002).
28 See summary at SHEILAGH C. OGILIV, STATE CORPORATISM AND PROTO-INDUSTRY: THE WURTTEMBERG
BLACK FOREST, 1580 1797, at 16-34 (1997).
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contract regulations,29  _that the more abstract debates about framing, economic
theory, and actual causation often have an apples-to -oranges quality. This does not
imply, of course, that the field should seek out paradigms for the sake of having
them-there are, as noted above, serious methodological risks to doing so-but it
does mean that there is much room for development. A finer balance between empir-
ical consensus and critical reexamination is probably something worth pursuing over
the long run.
In addition, relatively few studies tackle both the issue of "which institutional dif-
ferences contributed to the divergence" and the underlying issue of "how did those
differences emerge in the first place." Most focus on the former-it is, after all, the
defining question of the field-but not the second, sometimes due to lack of space,
sometimes due to perceived methodological limitations.3 0 While certainly under-
standable at the individual level, a systemic failure to probe more deeply into the so-
ciopolitical, and perhaps cultural, origins of institutions is a serious problem:
institutions are, as any legal historian or social scientist will attest, inherently human
constructs that undergo constant social scrutiny, and are often susceptible to change.
It is therefore imperative to carefully consider why-and how-institutions exist in
the first place, before employing them as analytical starting points in a study of eco-
nomic divergence. One would otherwise find it difficult, if not impossible, to under-
stand how these institutions functioned in real socioeconomic contexts, and, in turn,
to accurately analyze their broader economic significance.
Some might argue that the analytical methods of institutional economics-by any
measure the primary disciplinary driving force behind law-oriented "divergence
studies"-are poorly equipped to study the underlying sociopolitical origins of insti-
tutional differences,3 but this is no reason to simply drop the inquiry. If econometric
methods are difficult to execute, then the proper academic response should be to
consider alternative methods, such as qualitative analysis, rather than to give up alto-
gether. Whatever their other problems, the "illustrative comparisons" discussed
above do at least display a wide range of methodologies and considerable intellectual
flexibility, engaging scholars across multiple disciplines. There really is no reason
why "divergence studies" cannot do the same. Moreover, given the high degree of
synchronization between institutional economics and political economy, including
several recent attempts to introduce "culture" into institutional economic models,
32
one has to wonder whether the perceived methodological difficulties are actually that
serious.
29 See, e.g., the differences between PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN CHINA: THE
QING AND THE REPUBLIC COMPARED (2001); THOMAS BUOYE, MANSLAUGHTER, MARKETS AND MORAL
ECONOMY: VIOLENT DISPUTES OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CHINA (2000); and TAIsu
ZHANG, KINSHIP, PROPERTY, AND AGRICULTURAL CAPITALISM IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL CHINA AND ENGLAND (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Yale University History Department, 2014).
30 For discussion on the methodological incompatibilities between traditional institutional economics and
"legal sociology," see Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
537, 542 (1998),
31 Id.
32 For example, Claudia R Williamson & Carrie B. Kerekes, Securing Private Property: Formal versus Informal
Institutions, 54J. LAW & ECON. 537 (2011); Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A
Historical and Theoretical Reflection of Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912 (1994).
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"Divergence studies" also suffer from some of the same thematic limitations as
the "legal encounters" literature discussed in section B: they, too, are innately limited
by their subject matter, and are therefore predominantly concerned with institutional
comparisons that have some plausible link to early modern economic divergence.
This tends to privilege economic institutions or constitutional features over, say,
criminal procedure or evidence rules, and rules out comparisons of medieval or clas-
sical institutions altogether. In general, the "illustrative comparisons" discussed in
section A cover a much larger set of potential comparisons than either "divergence
studies" or "legal encounters studies"-and therein lie both their intellectual appeal
and some of their fundamental methodological difficulties. It is possible to see "cate-
gory two" and "category three" comparisons simply as subsets of "category one"
comparisons. And this justifies the Sino-European comparison by linking it to some
cross-regional event with actual historical significance, for instance, actual institu-
tional interaction between Chinese and European parties in category two and the
"Great Divergence" in category three. One should not presume that this is an exhaus-




Is it really necessary, in the end, to justify the choice of comparing China and
Europe? Is it not possible to believe that virtually any comparative exercise is worth-
while? The value of comparative exercises could lie, after all, in their ability to draw
our attention to institutional features that we otherwise would have overlooked,
rather than their ability to explain or illustrate inter-societal historical change. The
choice of China and Europe is therefore a personal one, dependent only on the indi-
vidual scholar's interests and abilities, and not fundamentally different, in an analyti-
cal sense, from any other comparison set.
This may be true as a general intellectual principle, but the specific binary of
China-Europe comes with enough intellectual baggage-in the form of a long history
of perceived "Eurocentricism" and "orientalism"-that an unconsidered, "knee-jerk"
decision to compare those two regions tends to arouse certain kinds of suspicions.
Given the still highly prevalent analytical imbalances and biases discussed in section
A, those suspicions are not necessarily without merit. This is not a unique problem:
in all likelihood, many comparisons between Asian, African, Middle Eastern, or Latin
American regions with "the West" suffer from the same imbalances and biases.34 The
problem, in the end, is that scholars still all too often fall back on the European expe-
rience as their "default reference point." None of this is to say that comparing other
parts of the world to Europe is undesirable. On the contrary, given the arguably cen-
tral importance of Europe in modern human history, such comparisons are very
much indispensable. In other words, such comparisons should be performed with
care, and preferably with some sense of methodological self-awareness.
33 For example, Sino-European struggles for prominence in other parts of the world Central Asia, or per-
haps Southeast Asia may open up new avenues of research.
34 See general discussion in Wallerstein, supra note 10.
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If we buy into the notion that any comparison, if properly executed, is intellectu-
ally worthwhile, then it is only fair to ask why there haven't more attempts to push
the comparative exercise beyond the usual two-region model, into something resem-
bling a "global legal history." Global history has rapidly gained significance in a num-
ber of fields, particularly economic, intellectual, and geopolitical history,3S and there
does not seem to be an obvious reason why legal history should not at least consider
joining the fray. If the point of comparative history is to highlight potentially over-
looked issues and problems, then surely the larger the comparative set the better.
Moreover, global comparisons potentially allow scholars to study socioeconomic and
political behavior in a more general, and perhaps more abstract, fashion-in other
words, to truly "theorize" about history.
This may sound fundamentally misguided to some. After all, the dominant histo-
riographical trend of the past several decades has arguably been the celebration of
contingency and complexity, not to mention systemic skepticism toward abstract
theorizing. Without commenting on the general value of such skepticism, its applica-
bility to comparative history is dubious, to say the least. The very point of compari-
son is to narrow down, to simplify the range of illustrative and causal possibility.
36
There is little doubt that this should be done on the basis of contextualized and nu-
anced analysis of domestic histories, and with a healthy appreciation of the role of
contingency. However, to argue against abstract analysis in comparative history is to
take away the central objective of comparison.
Either we do not compare at all, or we must accept that comparative exercises
aim, in the end, to theorize. Even when we focus on explaining differences between
legal systems, we are attempting to highlight, via comparison, certain socioeconomic
or political features that have a stronger claim to being "but-for" causes for those
legal differences-which is fundamentally an act of abstraction and theorizing. If so,
then perhaps the eventual production of a "global legal history" is something worth
pursuing after all.
35 For example, JERRY H. BENTLEY, SHAPES OF WORLD HISTORY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY SCHOLARSHIP (1996).
36 This is especially true when the comparison is made in a functionalist manner.
